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Abstract
Many patterns of affiliative behaviour have been described for primates, for instance: reciprocation and exchange of
grooming, grooming others of similar rank, reconciliation of fights, and preferential reconciliation with more valuable
partners. For these patterns several functions and underlying cognitive processes have been suggested. It is, however,
difficult to imagine how animals may combine these diverse considerations in their mind. Although the co-variation
hypothesis, by limiting the social possibilities an individual has, constrains the number of cognitive considerations an
individual has to take, it does not present an integrated theory of affiliative patterns either. In the present paper, after
surveying patterns of affiliation in egalitarian and despotic macaques, we use an individual-based model with a high
potential for self-organisation as a starting point for such an integrative approach. In our model, called GrooFiWorld,
individuals group and, upon meeting each other, may perform a dominance interaction of which the outcomes of winning
and losing are self-reinforcing. Besides, if individuals think they will be defeated, they consider grooming others. Here, the
greater their anxiety is, the greater their ‘‘motivation’’ to groom others. Our model generates patterns similar to many
affiliative patterns of empirical data. By merely increasing the intensity of aggression, affiliative patterns in the model
change from those resembling egalitarian macaques to those resembling despotic ones. Our model produces such patterns
without assuming in the mind of the individual the specific cognitive processes that are usually thought to underlie these
patterns (such as recordkeeping of the acts given and received, a tendency to exchange, memory of the former fight,
selective attraction to the former opponent, and estimation of the value of a relationship). Our model can be used as a null
model to increase our understanding of affiliative behaviour among primates, in particular macaques.
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Introduction
Patterns of affiliative behaviour have long puzzled primatolo-
gists. One of the most frequent behavioural acts is grooming. It has
been explained as serving several functions, such as cleaning the
fur [1], reducing anxiety, tension and stress [2], social bonding [3],
repairing relationships [4] and social reciprocation and exchange
[5]. As regards the mechanisms of exchange, individuals have been
supposed to direct grooming up the hierarchy in order to receive
more effective support in return, and due to competition for
partners of high rank they may end up grooming others of similar
rank [6]. Besides, they were also supposed to groom others of
similar rank, because individuals of similar rank have similar needs
[7]. Grooming between two former opponents immediately after a
fight has been interpreted to function as a means to repair the
relationship or ‘reconcile’, because it occurred significantly earlier
after a fight than otherwise in matching control periods the next
day. Besides, individuals appeared to reconcile in particular with
those partners that appeared more valuable to them, the so-called
‘valuable-relationship hypothesis’ [8].
To complicate matters, the degree of exchange and reciproca-
tion [9] appeared to differ between egalitarian and despotic
species. Applying market theory [10,11], this was explained by
assuming that the exchange rate of services differed between the
two competitive regimes [9]. Further, the co-variation hypothesis
explained the lower conciliatory tendency in despotic societies by
the greater danger involved in reconciliation in these species [12].
Many specific cognitive considerations have been suggested to
underlie these affiliative patterns. For instance, as regards
reciprocity and exchange, the individuals are supposed to keep
records of the acts of grooming and tune them to frequencies of
receipt of being groomed or another act, such as support [13], and
to use their knowledge of the ranks of others to obtain more
effective support [6,14]. Besides, individuals have been supposed
to be attracted to others of higher rank [6] and to others of similar
rank [7]. The supposed cognition underlying reconciliation
consists of the ability to remember the former opponent and of
selective attraction to the former opponent or a conciliatory
disposition [15,16]. As to their inclination particularly to reconcile
fights with opponents that are of greater value to them, the so-
called ‘valuable-relationship hypothesis’ [8,17–23], three key
components are supposed to influence the quality of a relationship,
namely its security, its value, and the compatibility of both
partners [8,24]. According to Silk [25] this implies that assessing
the value of a relationship over the long-term requires cognitive
sophistication, because it asks for a precise memory of what
happened in the past and for a correct evaluation of the
relationship in the long run.
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evidence for each of these theories is not conclusive [5,26–30].
Second, from a scientific perspective, these numerous different
theories for specific patterns of affiliation (such as exchange and
reconciliation) must be integrated in some way. Third, the use of
grooming as a ‘currency of exchange’ is dangerously anthropo-
morphic according to us and others [25,31,32]. As a more
parsimonious alternative, we suggest to follow a more distributed
approach based on local interactions and rules of thumb [31,33–
36]. Fourth, even though primates are obviously intelligent [37,38]
it seems much to ask of primates to combine intentionally all these
rational considerations in the distribution of their affiliative
behaviour (e.g. to consider what incidence of grooming was used
in exchange for something, and what for reconciliation or
maintenance and development of social bonds). Fifth, often simple
rules suffice to cause many of the observed patterns and herewith
an integrative theory [39,40]. Therefore fewer cognitive processes
may suffice as shown for instance in a model for dominance style
[32,41]. A similar integrative approach based on fewer cognitive
processes is also suggested by the co-variation hypothesis (or theory
of social epigenesis). In this theory part of the behavioural acts is
supposed to be forced by constraints due to the specifics of the
social structure [12].
For these reasons, we use in the present paper a computer
model to develop an integrative approach to patterns of social
affiliation in primates. We first precede this by a survey of the
precise patterns of dominance style and affiliation found in the
literature. In the model, we assume very little cognitive
deliberations by the individuals to groom others: Individuals
merely groom others out of fear of being defeated and to reduce
their own anxiety. Individuals do not intend to reconcile fights nor
to exchange or reciprocate grooming. Our model is an extension
of our earlier model of grouping and competition, called
DomWorld [42,43]. We choose DomWorld, because it has
reproduced many of the patterns of aggression, dominance and
spatial structure that have been observed in despotic and
egalitarian societies of primates, in particular of macaques. These
have arisen merely as a side effect of local rules for grouping and
competition through the feedback between hierarchical develop-
ment and spatial-social structure with dominants in the centre and
subordinates at the periphery [35,41,44–46]. Note that the
hierarchy develops via self-reinforcing effects of victory and defeat,
which have been described for many species including primates
[45,47–50]. Through these self-reinforcing effects, occasional
victories of low ranking individuals may lead to rank reversals.
This is important, because dominance hierarchies in empirical
data are not entirely stable [51–55].
Interactions in our new model, called GrooFiWorld (a
contraction of groom and fight), are extended with the option to
groom. When individuals meet each other at close proximity, they
will consider whether to groom, to fight or to rest. As to the order
of what to do first, we are led by four observations: first, those on
baboons by Kummer [56] who inform us that upon their first
encounter individuals first fight and later groom; second, by the
empirical finding that an individual builds up anxiety (as indicated
by the increased heart rate) when approaching an opponent by
whom it may be defeated [rhesus monkeys, 57]; third, that anxiety
increases after a fight as is indicated by the increase in frequency of
scratching and heart rate in both opponents [25,58–64]; fourth,
that anxiety may subsequently be reduced (in many species) by the
receipt of affiliative behaviour as indicated by the reduced heart
rate and the rate of self-directed behaviour [57,61,62,64] and to a
lesser degree by active grooming [65]. Furthermore, our model is
informed by empirical studies on grooming and opiate adminis-
tration which indicate that not being groomed for some length of
time reduces the concentration of endorphins and increases the
motivation to be groomed, and that grooming increases the level
of endorphins in the brain and reduces the motivation to groom
[66–71].
In sum upon encountering someone else, an individual in our
model first deliberates whether or not to attack. This decision
depends on the risks involved (whereby risk concerns the chance of
losing a fight), as is the case among primates [72], and as in our
earlier model: a fight is only initiated when the individual expects
to win [41,73]. If defeat is expected, its fear of losing makes the
individual consider grooming the other. Its decision whether or
not to groom depends on its degree of anxiety: an individual that is
more anxious is more inclined to groom (instead of resting close
by). After being groomed by another and (a little less) after actively
grooming another, its anxiety and therefore its tendency to groom
diminishes. Its anxiety also increases after a fight and after a period
of not having been involved in grooming. Note that we do not
distinguish between anxiety, tension or stress.
In order to compare the patterns of affiliative behaviour in our
model with those in real primates, we used the same statistical
measures as applied in empirical data and we confined ourselves to
macaques for two reasons. First, because their social behaviour has
been studied extensively and shown to differ in interesting ways
between the typical egalitarian and despotic societies [74,75].
Second, because in our earlier model, DomWorld patterns of
dominance and aggressive interaction were remarkably similar to
those of macaques [41,45]. Since GrooFiWorld is an extension of
this model, we assume it to also be suitable for comparing to
macaques.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we summarise the
literature on the common patterns of affiliative behaviour in
females of egalitarian and despotic species of macaques (Table 1).
Second, we tune the percentage of grooming time and the
unexpectedly emerging percentage of reconciliation to empirical
data for despotic societies. Third, by varying the intensity of
aggression we show the emergence of all these common patterns of
affiliation and their differences between typical egalitarian and
Author Summary
Individual primates distribute their affiliative behaviour
(such as grooming) in complex patterns among their
group members. For instance, they reciprocate grooming,
direct it more to partners the higher the partner’s rank, use
it to reconcile fights and do so in particular with partners
that are more valuable. For several types of patterns (such
as reconciliation and exchange), a separate theory based
on specific cognitive processes has been developed (such
as individual recordkeeping, a tendency to exchange,
selective attraction to the former opponent, and estima-
tion of the value of a relationship). It is difficult to imagine
how these separate theories can all be integrated
scientifically and how these processes can be combined
in the animal’s mind. To solve this problem, we first
surveyed the empirical patterns and then we developed an
individual-based model (called GrooFiWorld) in which
individuals group, compete and groom. The grooming
rule is based on grooming out of fear of defeat and on the
anxiety reducing effects of grooming. We show that in this
context this rule alone can explain many of the patterns of
affiliation as well as the differences between egalitarian
and despotic species. Our model can be used as a null
model to increase our understanding of affiliative patterns
of primates.
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understand how these patterns emerge, we remove different
assumptions in turn, such as the self-reinforcing effects of victory
and defeat and effects of spatial proximity. Fifth, the explanation
of the causation of these patterns in the model leads to new
hypotheses about the interconnection between other traits which
we confirm in the model. Part of these predicted patterns appear
also to be found in empirical data described by scientists in other
contexts. Other patterns still need to be tested empirically. Since
for all patterns empirical data are insufficient, we list them together
in Table 2 so that the relevance of our model to empirical data
may be tested in the future.
Methods
The model
A demo of our model can be seen in Video S1. The model is
individual-oriented and event-driven [76]. It has been written in
C++, as an extension of a previous model of grouping and
competition, called Dom-World [41,42,77,78] which has been
reimplemented in C++ by Hanno Hildenbrandt. The extension
consists of the addition of grooming behaviour (for default
parameters see Table 3). Therefore, we call it ‘GrooFiWorld’.
The individuals are provided with three tendencies: 1) to group, 2)
to perform dominance interactions and 3) to display affiliative
behaviour. Why individuals actually group (whether to avoid
predators or because resources are clumped) is not specified and
irrelevant to the model. The same holds for dominance
interactions which may reflect competition for resources such as
food and mates, but these resources are not explicitly specified in
the model. Individuals groom to reduce Anxiety, as suggested for
real primates [66–71,79–81].
GrooFiWorld consists of a ‘world’ (without borders) containing
its interacting individuals. The space of the ‘world’ is continuous,
i.e. individuals are free to move in any direction. Individuals have
a certain angle of vision (VisionAngle) and a maximum distance of
perception (MaxView). At the start of each run they occupy random
locations within a predefined circumference, InitRadius, which is
the product of an arbitrary constant times the number of
individuals.
Activities of individuals are regulated by a timing regime in
which each individual receives a random waiting time from a
uniform distribution and the individual with the shortest waiting
time is activated first. This regime is combined with a biologically
plausible timing regime reflecting a kind of social facilitation [e.g.,
see 82] in which the waiting time of an individual is shortened
Table 1. Dominance style and affiliative patterns for different species of macaques, D=despotic, E=egalitarian.
Species
Macaca
mulatta
Macaca
fuscata
Macaca
assamensis
Macaca
thibetana
Macaca
nemestrina
Macaca
fascicularis
Macaca
sylvanus
Macaca
radiata
Macaca
arctoides
Macaca
silenus
Macaca
nigra
Macaca
tonkeana
Dominance style D
1 D
1 D
1 D
2 D
3 D
1 E
1 E
1 E
1 E
1* E
1 E
1
Unidirectionality
aggression
1
True True True True True True Not true Not true Not true Not true Not true Not true
Frequency of aggression Low
5 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA High
5 NA NA High
6
Interindividual distance High
5 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Low
5 NA NA Low
6
Centrality of dominants NA True
4 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Conciliatory tendency ,7%
1 ,10%
1 ,11%
7 ,6%
8 ,32%
9 ,18%
1 ,20%
1 ,29%
10 ,35%
11 ,70%
1 ,50%
1 ,50%
1
Grooming reciprocation True
12 True
12 NA NA NA True
12 True
12 True
12 True
12 NA NA True
6
Grooming up the
hierarchy
True
13,14 True
13,15,16 True
17 NA NA True
13,14 NA NA Not true
18 NA NA Not true
6
Grooming partners of
similar rank
True
13,14 True
13,16 NA NA NA True
13,14 NA NA Not true
18 NA NA Not true
6,18
Reconciliation with
valuable partners
NA True
19 True
20 True
8 True
9 True
21 NA NA True
11 NA NA NA
*indicates that there is debate about the classification of the dominance style of this species.
1[12].
2[51].
3[105].
4[107–109].
5[106,150].
6[80,118].
7[112].
8[151].
9[18,152].
10[63].
11[19,29,153].
12[154].
13[155].
14[7].
15[27].
16[156].
17[105].
18[157].
19[21,125].
20[20].
21[158].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000630.t001
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individual’s NearView).
Grouping rules
Whenever an individual does not see another one close by (within
its personal space, PersSpace), grouping rules come into effect. The
individual starts looking for others at greater and greater distances
(NearView and MaxView). If, even then, no one else is in sight, it turns
over a SearchAngle in order to scan for others. In this way individuals
tend to remain in a group (Figure 1 and Table 3).
If, however, an individual spots another one close by, within its
personal space (PersSpace), a social interaction may take place.
Interactions
Upon encountering someone else the individual first deliberates
whether or not it will perform a dominance interaction on the
basis of the risk of losing the fight [following the so-called ‘risk-
sensitive attack strategy’, 43]. Only if it expects to be defeated, it
will consider grooming. In real primates, motivation to groom
depends on opiate concentrations as well as on other physiological
conditions such as stress levels, and we have coded these factors
together as Anxiety [66–68,71,83] (Figure 1). Thus, in GrooFi-
World, first, the more anxious an individual is the more likely it is
to groom (instead of resting close by); second, after being groomed
and (a little less) after actively grooming another, an individual’s
anxiety and thus its tendency to groom declines; third, after not
having been involved in grooming for some time an individual’s
anxiety builds up again; and fourth, an individual’s anxiety grows
after a fight. Thus anxiety reflects the psychological and
physiological state of an individual.
Dominance rules
Dominance interactions are modelled as before [41,46] and
they are an extension of the DoDom rules of Hogeweg [46]. First,
an individual i estimates whether it will win on the basis of a
‘mental battle’ (Equation 1). It may do so once [84] or repeatedly
depending on its degree of sensitivity to risks (RiskSens Table 3 and
Parameters and Experimental Setup). Higher values of RiskSens
indicate that individuals need to win several mental fights before
starting an actual interaction. Here, individuals i and j observe
each other’s capacity of winning, i.e. their dominance values Domi
and Domj. The probability of winning for individual i is greater if it
is higher in rank, and this is proportional to the Dom-value of
individual i relative to that of its opponent j (Equation 1). It expects
to be victorious if its relative dominance value is greater than a
random value drawn from a uniform distribution between zero
and one. If this is the case, a dominance interaction takes place.
During the actual dominance interaction, the individual i
compares its relative dominance value again with another value
randomly drawn and if its relative dominance value is greater than
a new random number, it wins (wi=1), else it loses (wi=0):
wi~
1
DOMi
DOMizDOMj
wRND(0,1)
0 else
2
4 ð1Þ
Table 2. List of model based hypotheses that emerge in the model.
Model-based hypotheses Empirical Data
A) In general:
1) Positive correlation between proximity and grooming [52,106,118]
2) No correlation between frequency of grooming by an individual and its rank pro: [128,129] contra: [52].
3) Positive correlation between grooming up the hierarchy and the gradient of the hierarchy [115]
4) Positive association between grooming others of similar rank and spatial centrality of dominants [7]
5) Positive correlation between % time grooming and % reconciliation in group Not available
6) Positive correlation between % interactions spent in grooming and % reconciliation in group Not available
7) Negative association between spatial rigidity and conciliatory tendency Not available
B) In despotic species:
1) Conciliatory tendency directed up the hierarchy [127]
C) In despotic species (compared to egalitarian ones):
1) The gradient of the hierarchy is steeper [9,159,160]
2) Higher ranking individuals are more often aggressive Not available
3) Higher ranking individuals receive less aggression Not available
4) Lower ranking individuals lose more fights Not available
5) Percentage of fighting is lower [106]
6) Distance among group members is larger [103,106,116,117]
7) The spatial structure (with dominants in the centre) is stronger Not available
8) The time spent grooming is lower [106]
9) Percentage of interactions spent in grooming is lower Not available
10) The diversity of neighbours is lower Not available
11) Stronger association between spatial proximity of partner and conciliatory tendency Not available
12) Negative correlation between dominance and anxiety is stronger Not available
13) The percentage with which females groom males is lower Not available
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000630.t002
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Parameter Description Females Males
General Parameters
Total Individuals Total number of individuals 12
Sex ratio (at high aggression intensity) Number of males and females 10 2
Sex ratio (at low aggression intensity) Number of males and females 8 4
InitRadius Predefined space at start of simulation 1.7*# Inds 1.7*# Inds
Grouping Parameters
Perspace Close encounter distance 8 8
Nearview Medium distance 24 24
MaxView Maximal viewing distance 50 50
SearchAngle Turning angle to find others 90u 90u
VisionAngle Angle of field of view 120u 120u
Dominance Parameters
InitDom Initial Dom value 16 32
RiskSens Number of ‘mental battles’ 2 2
StepDom (high aggression intensity) Scaling factor for aggression intensity 0.8 1
StepDom(low aggression intensity) Scaling factor for aggression intensity 0.08 0.1
Fleeing Dist After loosing a fight 2 2
Grooming Parameters
InitAnx Initial anxiety value 0.5 0.5
AnxInc Increase in anxiety after every activation 1% 1%
AnxDcrGree Decrease in anxiety in groomee 0.15 0.15
AnxDcrGrmr Decrease in anxiety in groomer 0.1 0.1
AnxIncFight Increase in anxiety after fighting 0.1 0.1
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000630.t003
Figure 1. Rules of behavioural interaction. In light grey boxes the new rules of GrooFiWorld related to grooming are indicated. In white boxes
the grouping rules, and in black boxes the rules for dominance interactions from DomWorld [41,43].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000630.g001
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reversals. To reflect the self-reinforcing effects of victory and
defeat [45,85], dominance values are updated by increasing the
dominance value of the winner and decreasing that of the loser by
the same amount:
DOMi~DOMiz wi{
DOMi
DOMizDOMj
  
  STEPDOM
DOMj~DOMj{ wi{
DOMj
DOMizDOMj
  
  STEPDOM
ð2Þ
This positive feedback is ‘dampened’ because a victory of a
higher ranking opponent increases its relative Dom-value only
slightly, whereas an (unexpected) success of the lower ranking
individual increases its relative dominance value by a greater
change. To keep Dom-values positive, their minimum value is,
arbitrarily, set at 0.01.
The change in Dom-values is multiplied by a scaling factor,
called StepDom, which varies between 0 and 1 and represents the
intensity of aggression [41,84] (see Parameters and Experimental
setup). High values imply a great change in Dom-value after a fight,
and thus indicate that single interactions (e.g. involving biting) may
strongly influence the future outcome of conflicts. Conversely, low
StepDom-values represent low impact (e.g. threats or slaps).
Winning an interaction includes chasing the opponent over a
distance of one unit and then turning randomly 45 degrees to right
or left in order to reduce the chance of repeated interactions
between the same opponents. The loser responds by fleeing under
a small random angle over a predefined FleeingDistance.
Grooming rules
If an individual meets another in its PersSpace and when it has
decided on the basis of a ‘mental’ battle that it is too dangerous to
attack, the individual considers whether or not to groom its
partner (Figure 1). Grooming behaviour is induced by the level of
Anxiety, which ranges from very relaxed to very tense, represented
by a scale from 0 to 1. If the Anxiety value is lower than a random
number, the individual will display ‘non-aggressive’ proximity;
otherwise, if Anxiety is higher, it will groom its partner (Figure 1).
After grooming both partners turn over a small angle (45u)
randomly to the right or left in order to avoid repeated interactions
with the same partner. Grooming reduces Anxiety. In line with
empirical evidence [61,62,64–71], it does so more strongly in the
groomee (with AnxDcrGree) than in the groomer (with AnxDcrGrmr)
(Table 3). During periods without grooming Anxiety increases,
which is consistent with opiate-dependent motivation to groom in
real primates [67,71]. This increase is updated after every
activation with AnxInc. Furthermore, inspired by the observed
increase in scratching after a fight in real primates [8], in the
model, after a fight Anxiety increases with AnxIncFght for both
opponents.
Parameters and experimental set-up
Many parameters that have been used in earlier studies were
kept at the same value, namely the NearView, MaxView, FleeingDist,
SearchAngle and StepDom values. Note that StepDom values (that
reflect intensity of aggression) differ between the sexes (on the basis
of the stronger muscular structure of males than females) and
between dominance styles reflecting the tendency of individuals in
despotic societies to bite relatively more (and slap and threaten
less) than in egalitarian ones [41,42,78,84,86] (Table 3). We used
12 individuals to represent the number of adults in a group of
primates. Since in empirical studies the percentage of females is
lower in egalitarian macaques with approximately 70% females
than despotic macaques with approximately 80% females, we have
set the sex ratio at low and high aggression intensity accordingly
(with 8 females, 4 males at low intensity and 10 females and 2
males at high intensity) [87–89]. The initial dominance values we
set at 16 for females and 32 for males, reflecting the initially higher
winning chance of males due to sexual dimorphism in fighting
power resulting from differences in body weight, physiology and
weaponry.
In order to tune the frequency of grooming to 20% of the time
as indicated for despotic societies of real primates by Dunbar [90],
we had to increase PerSpace from 4 to 8 units (reflecting a tendency
to interact with others over larger distances), to increase the risk-
sensitivity of individuals by increasing the number of mental
battles ‘ego’ had to win before starting a real dominance
interaction (in order to reduce the frequency of aggression)
(RiskSens, Table 3) and to tune the Anxiety-related parameters (see
Table 3).
To understand what caused the patterns of affiliation in the
model, each of four assumptions related to grooming and
fighting were switched off in turn. The simulation was run in
turn 1) without the self-reinforcing effects of winning and losing
fights, 2) without the grooming inducing effect of anxiety, 3)
without the dependence of grooming on the risks to attack and
4) without the selection of interaction partners on the basis of
spatial proximity.
First, when switching off the self-reinforcing effects of winning
and losing, we gave the individuals Dom values that were constant.
We took these values from runs with the corresponding intensity of
aggression, because hierarchical differentiation was greater at a
high than at a low StepDom. We took the values from the middle
(i.e. period 230) of the interval between periods 200 and 260,
because in this interval the Dom values were considered to have
stabilised [91], since the average Dom values between period 200
and 230 are significantly correlated with those between 230 and
260 (Kendall Tau, N=10, High intensity Tau=0.88 ***, Low
intensity Tau=0.85** two tailed probability).
Second, to switch off the grooming inducing effect of Anxiety
implies that we made grooming independent of the value of
Anxiety. In this case, the individual always groomed its partner
whenever it refrained from attack because of high risks.
Third, switching off fear-based grooming, implied that we
made grooming independent of the risks of defeat, i.e. upon
meeting another individual in its PerSpace we gave the
individual a 50% chance to either consider grooming it or
attacking it. After choosing between attacking and grooming,
the risk-sensitive decision procedure was used to decide
whether the individual actually attacked and the anxiety-based
rule was used to decide whether it actually groomed. If the
individual decided to refrain from interacting, it rested at its
location.
Fourth, to switch off proximity-based interactions, interaction
partners were chosen at random independent of their proximity in
space.
Data collection and analysis
Every run consisted of 260 periods and each period
consisted of 240 activations (the number of individuals (i.e.
12) times 20). Data were collected from period 200 to 260 to
exclude any bias caused by transient values. Data consisted of
every change in spatial position and in heading direction of
each individual and, as regards social interactions, we recorded
(1) the identity of the attacker and its opponent, (2) that of the
Emergent Patterns of Social Affiliation
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the identity of the groomer and groomee and (5) the updated
Anxiety value of the individuals. For each model (the complete
model and the four controls with a missing assumption) 10
independent simulations were run for each of the two
aggression intensities (high and low). The results are shown
here per condition as the average statistic of these 10 runs with
their combined probability using the improved Bonferroni
procedure [92]. Patterns apparent in empirical studies of
egalitarian and despotic macaques (Table 1) were tested for by
means of (combined) one-tailed probabilities (Tables 4 and 5),
all the other patterns were tested with two-tailed probabilities
(Tables 6 and 7). To test for differences in patterns between
high and low intensity of aggression, we used the Mann
Whitney U test whereby we compared the statistics between 10
runs at a high and 10 runs at a low intensity of aggression (see
Tables 4, 5, 6).
The percentage of time females spend in fighting (or in
grooming) is calculated as the number of fights (grooming) in the
group divided between the total number of activations. The
percentage of interaction time spend in grooming is the frequency
of grooming divided by that of grooming plus that of fighting.
The hierarchical differentiation among all females was mea-
sured by the coefficient of variation of Dom values (standard
deviation divided by the mean). For each run the average value
was calculated (over period 200–260) and this was averaged over
10 runs. Higher values indicate greater rank distances among
individuals [41]. Hierarchical differentiation is also reflected in the
empirical behavioural measure of the degree of unidirectionality of
aggression [12,93], which we show also (Table 4).
The diversity of partners with whom a female interacts is
measured by the Berger-Parker dominance index [94] by dividing
an individual’s frequency of grooming with its most favourite
partner by its total grooming frequency.
The rank of group members we calculated as the average Dom
value of each individual per run over periods 200–260. We used
an average measure, because we correlated it with an average
measure of aggressive and affiliative acts, i.e. data were summed
over the whole interval of period 200–260. Apart from the average
dominance value as a measure of rank we applied also a
behavioural measure used in empirical studies, namely the average
percentage of winning [95].
The degree to which dominant individuals (both males and
females) occupy the centre was measured by a correlation between
an individual’s average Dom value and the average spatial direction
of others around it. The centrality of each individual is calculated
by means of circular statistics by drawing a unit circle around ego
and projecting the direction of other group members as points on
the circumference of this circle [96]. The connection of these
points with ego’s location results in vectors. The length of the
mean vector represents the degree to which group members
relative to ego form a cluster. Thus, longer mean vectors indicate a
more peripheral, and hence, less central location of ego.
Therefore, centrality of dominants is represented by a negative
correlation between rank and the length of average vector
(indicating the average direction of others).
Table 4. Dominance style and affiliative patterns (for measurements see methods).
Real macaque societies Model
Intensity of aggression Despotic Egalitarian High Low
Dominance Style
1) Gradient of Hierarchy NA NA 0.86 0.11
Gradient of the hierarchy High.Low NA U=100 ***
2) Unidirectionality of aggression True NS 20.45** 0.18*
Unidirectionality of aggression High.Low True U=99 ***
3) Time spent fighting (%) 15–16% 16–18%
Fighting % High,Low NA U=97 ***
4) Mean distance among group members Low High 17 10
Average distance High,Low NA U=100 ***
5) Centrality of Dominants (Tau) True NA 20.56* 0.06
Centrality High.Low NA U=100 ***
Affiliative patterns
6) Time spent grooming (%) 8–15% NA 13– –23% 28–30%
7) Conciliatory tendency 7–18%
1 20–50%
2 7–17% 16–22%
Conciliatory tendency High,Low True
1 U=98 ***
TauKr Correlations
8) Grooming Reciprocation True True 0.31** 0.45**
9) Grooming up the hierarchy True NS 0.44** 0.05
10) Grooming partners of similar rank True NS 0.25** 0.04
11) Reconciliation with valuable partners True True 0.21** 20.04
One tailed p-values of tests are combined via the improved Bonferroni method (n=10): * p,0.05, **p,0.01, ***p,0.001. In bold italics are the two percentages which
quantities were tuned to empirical data (although reconciliation in itself was emergent). In bold are results that differ from empirical data.
1,2Data of conciliatory tendencies of Macaca nemestrina
1 and Macaca silenus
2 were excluded, because these were considered as outliers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000630.t004
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the PC-MC method (i.e. Post-Conflict versus Matched-Control).
Here, we have used its improved version [16,97]. In it a
comparison is made between the moment in which grooming
occurs during a short interval after a conflict, the so-called Post-
Conflict period, and the moment it occurs in a control period of
the same length (ten minutes), the Matched-Control period, taken
a day later at the same time. Because our model is event-driven,
we use its average number of fights over the interval 200–260 (of
2196 acts at high intensity) and the average frequency of fights per
hour of rhesus monkeys of 0.2 per hour per individual [98] and a
day length of about 13h to estimate that the interval of ten minutes
is approximated by three activations in the model (one activation is
about 3.8 min) and the interval of one day is approximately
represented by one period. These are of course abstractions but
results appear to be robust (see Sensitivity to parameter changes).
Dyads were classified as ‘attracted’, when grooming happened
earlier in the Post-Conflict period than in the Matched-Control.
Pairs were classified as ‘dispersed’, when grooming happened in
the reverse way, and as ‘neutral’, when grooming happened
exactly at the same time or did not happen at all. Following [97],
we calculated the conciliatory tendency, CT, of the group as:
CT~
NumberAttractedPairs{NumberDispersedPairs
TotalNumberOfConflictPairs
To measure the conciliatory tendency of each female with each of
its group members, we calculated per pair the number of times
they groomed sooner after a fight than in the matched control
(attracted events) minus the cases where the opposite happened
(dispersed events) divided by the total number of fights of the pair.
Correlations between the distribution of grooming, proximity,
aggression and reconciliation among females, and between social
interactions and rank were measured by means of the Tau-Kr
correlation as described by Hemelrijk [93,99], which is frequently
used in studies of animal behaviour [100–102]. The advantage of
this statistic is that it is animal-centred, because it takes variation in
grooming and aggression between individuals into account by
measuring the correlation between the corresponding rows of two
social interaction matrices and because it accounts for the
dependence of data in an interaction matrix. The level of
significance was calculated using 2000 permutations [93,99]. We
tested for unidirectionality of attack and reciprocity of grooming
by correlating an actor and receiver matrix with the Tau-Kr
correlation. Note that unidirectionality and reciprocity are
opposite correlations: a significantly negative correlation implies
unidirectionality, whereas a significantly positive correlation
implies reciprocity [93].
Whether grooming was directed up the hierarchy and to
partners of similar rank was computed by the Tau-Kr
correlation between, on the one hand, the grooming matrix
and, on the other hand, respectively, the partner-rank-matrix
(with the average Dom values of grooming partners in the rows)
and the similar-rank-matrix (filled with zeros apart from the
partners closest and second closest in rank, which are indicated
as 1’s). Note that the higher-ranking individuals have higher
Table 5. Dominance style and affiliative patterns when taking out different assumptions (see methods).
No self-reinforcing
effects
No anxiety induced
grooming No fear of defeat No spatial structure
Intensity of aggression High Low High Low High Low High Low
Dominance Style
1) Gradient of the hierarchy 0.73 0.08 0.74 0.09 0.62 0.07 0.75 0.10
Gradient of the hierarchy High.Low U=100 *** U=100 *** U=100 *** U=100 ***
2) Unidirectionality of aggression 20.41** 0.16** 20.39** 0.20** 20.17* 0.25** 20.68** 20.15*
Unidirectionality of aggression High.Low U=100 *** U=100 *** U=97 *** U=100 ***
3) Time spent fighting (%) 14–15% 17–18% 12–15% 13–14% 7–9% 6–7% 31–37% 26–
27%
Fighting % High,Low U=100 *** U=50.5 NS U=96 NS U=100 NS
4) Average distance among group-members 17.07 10.13 16.83 11.68 18.65 15.51 NA NA
Average distance High,Low U=100 *** U=97 *** U=96 *** NA
5) Centrality of dominants 20.52** 20.10 20.49* 20.27 20.41* 0.04 NA NA
Centrality High.Low U=90 ** U=76 * U=90 ** NA
Affiliative Patterns
6) Time spent grooming (%) 16–18% 27–30% 16–32% 34–38% 19–24% 22–27% 41–42% 41%
7) Conciliatory tendency 10–14% 14–21% 5–20% 19–25% 19–28% 20–28% 0–2% 0–5%
Conciliatory tendency High,Low U=100 *** U=99 *** U=56 NS U=68 NS
Tau-Kr Correlations
8) Grooming reciprocation 0.39** 0.50** 0.33** 0.47** 0.69*** 0.67*** 20.52 0.00
9) Grooming up the hierarchy 0.46** 0.06 0.39** 0.11* 0.01 0.02 0.59** 0.07
10) Grooming those of similar rank 0.18* 0.06 0.18** 20.01 0.06 0.04 0.08 20.05
11) Reconciliation with valuable partners 0.23* 20.03 0.17* 20.03 0.04* 0.04 NA NA
One tailed p-values of tests are combined via the improved Bonferroni method: * p,0.05, **p,0.01, ***p,0.001. Results that differ from the complete model (in
Table 4) are shown in bold.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000630.t005
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partner-rank-matrix corresponds to grooming being directed up
the hierarchy, and a significantly positive correlation with the
similar-rank-matrix corresponds to a high degree of grooming
among individuals of similar rank.
To test the valuable-relationship hypothesis, we defined
valuable relationships on the basis of the grooming frequency as
is done by primatologists [e.g. 20,21,e.g. 23]. We used the
frequency of grooming that occurred per dyad outside of the
context of reconciliation in order for correlations with reconcil-
iation not to be circular. We determined the degree of
reconciliation with valuable partners by means of the Tau-Kr
correlation between the matrices of the conciliatory tendency per
dyad and that of the frequency of grooming per dyad outside the
context of fighting (by subtracting the acts of conciliatory
grooming from the matrix with all grooming acts). A significant
positive correlation reflects that reconciliation is more frequent
with partners that are more valuable.
Results
Empirical patterns
As regards our distinction of macaques in egalitarian and
despotic, we updated the classification of Thierry [103,104]
with new data on Tibetan macaques (Macaca thibetana) [51] and
Assamese macaques (Macaca assamensis) [105]. Therefore, we
rated as egalitarian Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus), bonnet
macaques (Macaca radiata), stumptailed macaques (Macaca
arctoides), lion-tailed macaque (Macaca silenus), Celebes crested
macaque (Macaca nigra) and tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana)
and as despotic we classified long-tailed macaques (Macaca
fascicularis), Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata), rhesus ma-
caques (Macaca mulatta), pigtailed macaques (M. nemestrina),
Tibetan macaques and Assamese macaques. Regarding the
dominance style (Table 1), the frequency of unidirectional
aggression, which is a measurement related to the hierarchical
gradient in macaques, appears to be higher in despotic than in
egalitarian species [12]; further, frequency of aggression is
lower [103] and average distance among all females is greater
[103,106]. Besides, for the despotic Japanese macaques, it has
been reported that dominants are in the center of the group
[107–109]. As to affiliative patterns, reconciliation occurs in
both types of species, and is more frequent in egalitarian
species [12]. Grooming is reciprocated in both egalitarian and
despotic species. Further, grooming is directed up the
hierarchy and to others of similar rank only in despotic
species. Reconciliation is directed significantly more often to
p a r t n e r st h a ta r em o r ev a l u a b l ei ns e v e r a ld e s p o t i cs p e c i e sa n d
according to a single study also in an egalitarian species,
Macaca arctoides [19].
Tuning the model
As described in the methods, we first tuned the percentage of
time spent on grooming at a high intensity of aggression so that it
resembled that of empirical data for despotic macaques [90].
Subsequently, we, unexpectedly, observed reconciliation. Since
there are more precise data on the conciliatory tendency of
despotic macaques than on their percentage of time spent on
grooming, we subsequently tuned the conciliatory tendency to that
of despotic macaques by adjusting the risk sensitivity further (7 in
Table 4).
Emergent patterns of dominance style and affiliation in
the model
As to the two dominance styles in our model, we first confirmed
that they still emerged, like they did in the earlier DomWorld
model without grooming [41,43]. In GrooFiWorld, at a high
intensity of aggression, the hierarchy appeared to be significantly
steeper than at a low intensity, aggression was more unidirectional,
time spent on fighting was less, average distance among all females
was greater and the spatial structure with dominants in the centre
and subordinates at the periphery was more conspicuous (1–5 in
Table 4; 1, 5–7 in Table 2C).
We confirm the resemblance of the affiliative patterns in the
model to empirical data (Tables 1, 4): The conciliatory tendency
appeared to be significantly higher at a low aggression intensity
than at a high one (7 in Table 4); grooming appeared to be
reciprocated at both intensities (8 in Table 4); a number of
significant correlations were confined to a high aggression
intensity, namely individuals direct their grooming significantly
1) up the hierarchy, 2) to others of similar rank, and 3) they
reconcile more often with more valuable (grooming) partners (9–
11 in Table 4). The only difference to empirical data concerns the
absence in the model of more frequent reconciliation with valuable
partners at low aggression intensity (11 in Table 4). However, in
empirical data this correlation for the valuable relationship
hypothesis was found only in a single empirical study of an
egalitarian species [19] and it was based on a different method, i.e.
the time rule method, whereas in the model we use the MC-PC
method.
Causation of patterns in the model and model-based
hypotheses
In order to understand what caused these patterns of affiliation
in the model, we took out four different assumptions in turn (see
Parameters and Experimental Set-up). This reduced the number
of emergent patterns. Switching off the self-reinforcing effect of the
outcome of a fight did not affect the patterns qualitatively, but
switching off the grooming-inducing effect of Anxiety changed three
patterns of the 28 (11%) (indicated in bold in Table 5). Making
Table 7. Comparison between different variables of the complete model and the model without fear of defeat at high intensity of
aggression (Mann Whitney U test, two-tailed).
Complete Model No fear of defeat Mann Whitney U test
1) Percentage of time spent grooming 13–23% 19–24% U=92 **
2) Percentage of interaction time spent grooming 45–59% 72–77% U=100 ***
3) Centrality 20.56* 20.41* U=76 *
4) Conciliatory tendency 7–17% 19–28% U=100 ***
5) Reconciliation with valuable partners 0.21** 0.04* U=92 ***
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000630.t007
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(29%) and choosing partners at random independent of spatial
proximity changed 20 patterns (75%). Thus patterns arose mainly
from the social-spatial group structure and secondly from
grooming being dependent on fear of defeat.
To explain the emergence of each of the affiliative patterns in
the model (Table 4), we proceed now by studying the effects of
each of the four above-mentioned assumptions by taking them out
(Table 5). This process leads to a number of model-based
hypotheses for empirical data (Table 2).
The emergence of grooming up the hierarchy depended on
grooming being based on fear of being defeated (without this
assumption the pattern disappeared) and on the intensity of
aggression (since it is absent at a low intensity of attack). This
arises because the hierarchical differentiation is stronger at a
high aggression intensity compared to a low one, and
aggression is more unidirectional (1, 2 in Tables 4 and 5).
Thus, when grooming depends on fear of defeat and the
difference in rank between the partners is high, lower ranking
ones will usually groom higher ranking ones and rarely attack
them (as a consequence of Eq 1).
Grooming reciprocation (8 in Table 4, 5) arose from spatial
structure, because it was disrupted only by taking out the socio-
spatial structure, but not by taking out any of the other three
assumptions. This means that, because certain individuals are
often in close proximity, they will groom each other mutually,
resulting in reciprocation. Furthermore, reciprocation appeared to
be strongest in the experimental control condition where grooming
did not depend on fear of defeat, and next strongest at a low
aggression intensity. This arose because reciprocation was
weakened less by differences in dominance, because these are
smaller at low intensity of aggression (1, 2 in Table 4 and 5).
Besides, at high aggression intensity, but not at a low one,
individuals automatically more often groomed partners that were
similar in rank. This was due to grooming being based on fear of
defeat, and due to spatial structure (10 in Tables 4 and 5). At a
high intensity of aggression, not only a steep hierarchy develops,
but also a spatial structure with dominants in the centre and
subordinates at the periphery that is clearer than at a low intensity
(1, 5 in Table 4; 1, 7 in Table 2C). Therefore individuals of similar
rank are closer together. Thus, at high aggression intensity because
individuals will groom up the hierarchy, while meeting mostly
others of similar rank, this means that everyone grooms those of
similar rank more often than those of lower rank, and, those of
similar rank approximately as often as those of higher rank.
Therefore, a correlation for grooming among individuals of similar
rank results. At a low intensity of aggression, spatial centrality of
dominants is absent (5 in Table 4) and due to the small rank
differences grooming is directed neither up the hierarchy, nor to
others of similar rank (9, 10 in Table 4).
The occurrence of reconciliation in our model is a side-effect of
spatial proximity, since it is almost absent if interaction partners
are chosen at random (7 in Table 5). Thus, reconciliation in the
model is largely due to the higher probability of two opponents to
be close to each other immediately after a fight (i.e. Post-Conflict)
than otherwise (during the Matched-Control).
Furthermore, the conciliatory tendency is reduced at high
intensity of aggression as a side-effect of the spatial structure and
the dependence of grooming on the fear of defeat; without these
assumptions the conciliatory tendency is independent of intensity
of attack (7 in Table 5). This happens for three reasons (to be
tested in empirical data, Table 2): at a high aggression intensity the
spatial structure is more static (10 in Table 2C), average inter-
individual distance is larger (6 in Table 2C), and centrality of
dominants is greater (7 in Table 2C). First, spatial structure is more
static at high aggression intensity, which is apparent from the
stronger spatial assortment by rank of individuals (5 in Table 4),
from the lower diversity of partners at high intensity of aggression
than at a low one (16 in Table 6, 10 in Table 2C), and from the
fact that the correlation between proximity and conciliatory
tendency is significantly stronger at a high aggression intensity
than at a low one (22 in Table 6; 11 in Table 2C). Therefore,
former opponents may have been more often close to each other
not only immediately after the conflict (in the post conflict period)
but also in the matched control. Consequently, it is more likely
that they groom each other in the matched control. If this
happened at an earlier moment than after the conflict (in the post
conflict period) it reduced the conciliator tendency. Second, due to
the greater differences in rank, individuals are further apart (1, 4 in
Tables 4 and 5) and groom less often both as calculated as the
percentage of time and the percentage of interactions at a high
than at a low intensity of aggression (13, 14 in Table 6; 8, 9 in
Table 2C). Thus, they will automatically also groom less often
immediately after a conflict, thus reconcile less than at a low
aggression intensity (7 in Tables 4, 5). Third, at a high intensity of
aggression grooming and conciliatory tendency are reduced
because of the combination of spatial structure and the fear of
defeat: If the fear of defeat is removed, the conciliatory tendency at
a high intensity of aggression is higher than in the complete model
(4 in Table 7), because spatial assortment according to dominance
(i.e. spatial centrality of dominants) is weaker than in the complete
model (3 in Table 7). Thus, dominants are relatively less often
activated (to fight) and this increases the relative frequency of
grooming because subordinates are aggressive less often (2 in
Table 6). Thus without fear of defeat the percentage of time spent
and interaction time spent on grooming is higher (13,14 in
Table 6), so that it is higher than it is at a high intensity of
aggression in the complete model (1, 2 in Table 7) and thus the
percentage of time spent on reconciliation is higher also (5, 6 in
Table 2A). Similarly, in the complete model, because at a lower
intensity of aggression spatial structure is weaker than at a high
intensity also, the percentage of grooming of the total number of
interactions (aggressive plus grooming) is higher at a low than high
intensity of aggression (14 in Table 6). Thus the conciliatory
tendency is lower at a high than low intensity also (5, 6 in
Table 2A).
Further, at a high intensity of attack reconciliation was
directed mostly to those partners that are more valuable (in
terms of grooming outside the context of reconciliation, 11 in
Table 4) and this was stronger than at low intensity (23 in
Table 6). This is due to (1) stronger effects of spatial proximity
(2) high intensity of attack, and (3) fear of defeat, because
without these traits there is no reconciliation with valuable
partners (11 in Table 5) or it is significantly weakened (23 in
Table 6). As regards spatial proximity, the stronger correlation
for valuable relationships arises because the spatial structure at
a high intensity is more rigid and therefore both reconciliation
and grooming are correlated stronger with the proximity
between partners than at a low intensity (20 and 22 in Table 6;
11 in Table 2C); thus, the two patterns of grooming and
reconciliation are correlated too at a high, but not at a low
intensity (11 in Table 4). As to the second and third cause, at a
high intensity of aggression (due to the strong hierarchical
differentiation) conciliatory tendency like grooming behaviour
appears to be directed up the hierarchy (9 in Table 6; 1 in
Table 2B), although this holds only when grooming is done out
of fear of defeat (9 in Table 6) like in ‘normal’ grooming which
does not occur after a conflict (9 in Table 4, 5).
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hypotheses
There are other patterns in the model that are of interest in it
self and for study in empirical data (Table 2). For instance, in the
model higher ranking individuals appear more aggressive due to
the lower risk involved (2 in Table 6), and less anxious (but only at
high intensity of aggression) (5 in Table 6; 12 in Table 2C) because
they have lost fewer fights (4 in Table 6) and these effects are
stronger at a high than low aggression intensity (10–12 in Table 6;
4 in Table 2C).
Further, both at a high and a low intensity of aggression, there is
no correlation between grooming and rank (6 in Table 6; 2 in
Table 2A). This is remarkable at high intensity of aggression,
because lower ranking individuals are more anxious and therefore,
they may be expected to groom others more often. The absence of
this correlation arises from the fact that a high grooming frequency
by low ranking individuals is counteracted by the spatial social
structure (5 in Table 5); due to their peripheral positions, low
ranking individuals have fewer opportunities to interact with
others than dominants do and therefore, despite their greater
tendency to groom, they do not groom more often than
dominants.
Sensitivity of patterns to parameter changes and the
measure of rank
As regards the sensitivity to changes of parameter, the affiliative
patterns were insensitive to different values of parameters related
to Anxiety. Values ranging from 0.001% to 10% for AnxInc and
values from 0.05 to 0.15 for AnxIncFight, AnxDcrGree and
AnxDcrGrmr (whereby AnxDcrGree was kept at higher values than
AnxDcrGrmr) changed the level of anxiety, but did not change
results qualitatively.
To obtain a sufficiently high number of interactions (both of
grooming and fighting) to detect affiliative patterns statistically,
a Perspace 8 was necessary, whereas a value of 4 was too low.
Furthermore, two mental fights (Equation 1) before initiating a
dominance interaction (RiskSens=2) were needed in order to
make the frequency of grooming higher than that of fighting
like in empirical data. Besides, in empirical data the percentage
of time spend fighting was lower in fierce than mildly
aggressive species. This was true when comparing the
percentage of fighting at high versus low intensity of aggression
in the model for RiskSens 1 and 2, but not for higher values of
RiskSens.
Results of reconciliation were similar if we prolonged the period
of Matched control from three activations to five and to ten
activations (Puga-Gonzalez et al in prep).
Since in the empirical data average dominance cannot be
accessed directly like in our model, we also tested all correlations
with a measure of dominance, i.e. their average percentage of
winning, which can be measured in real behaviour [95]. All results
of Table 4 and 6 remain similar (also in the strength of the
significance), apart from two correlations in Table 6: when
correlating with the average percentage of winning as a measure of
dominance, at a high intensity of aggression, higher ranking
individuals groom others significantly less and at a low intensity of
aggression, the negative correlation between aggression received
and dominance is no longer significant (data available on request).
It should be noted however, that to explain patterns of our
simulation, the correlations with average dominance value are of
greater interest than with percentage of fight won because the
average dominance value is a more direct cause of behaviour in
the model.
Discussion
Our model presents us with an integrative theory of affiliative
behaviour in primates, because it gives a coherent explanation for
aspects of many of the patterns of affiliation typical of egalitarian
and despotic macaques. It does so, while it only makes the
‘cognitive’ assumptions that individuals are 1) intending to group,
2) they recognise each others rank (here it is unspecified whether
this is due to the other’s body posture, former experiences with the
other or due to observations of interactions among other group
members, or some or all of these), 3) in their initiation of
aggression they are sensitive to risks of losing a fight, 4) their
grooming is induced by the expectation of losing a fight, and 5) the
wish to decrease their anxiety. Anxiety is induced by fighting and
increases with the duration of not being groomed. Thus,
remarkably, in contrast to views of others [4,6,13,15], our model
ignores a number of the specific cognitive assumptions that have
been made for primates. In it individuals only need minimal
information. Thus, our model generates a) reciprocation without
that the individual keeps records in its memory of services given to
and received from each of its partners, b) grooming up the
hierarchy without an intention to receive support in exchange, c)
grooming others of similar rank without competition for higher-
ranking grooming partners or attraction to higher ranking-
partners, d) reconciliation without a conciliatory predisposition
or a memory of, and a selective attraction to, a former opponent
and e) reconciliation with partners that are more valuable without
any estimate of the quality of the relationship. Besides, it
reproduces the differences between egalitarian and despotic
species in their conciliatory tendency without a difference between
low and high intensity of aggression in possibilities to negotiate
[110] and without reconciliation reducing conflict escalation
[111]. Our model also provides us with coherent mechanisms
for the systematic variation hypothesis or the co-variation
hypothesis [12,18,75,103,104,112–114].
As to the function of reconciliation, our model does not
represent this specifically in its rules, since reconciliation emerges
from a rule that makes individuals groom merely to reduce
anxiety. Thus, its function is to reduce anxiety. However, in our
model (like in reality) grooming occurs more often after a fight
than at other times. Therefore, if similar processes in reality cause
patterns of reconciliation, such emergent patterns of reconciliation
after a fight may still function to repair a relationship.
Causation of patterns in the model
The causation of each of the affiliative patterns in the model is
as follows. First, grooming up the hierarchy results when
aggression intensity is high and the hierarchy is steep because
individuals seldom dare to attack higher ranking ones, and
therefore in order to reduce their anxiety they groom up the
hierarchy instead. When aggression intensity is low, the hierarchy
is weak, thus individuals experience a smaller risk to attack higher
ranking ones and therefore there is no such pattern.
Other patterns depend on the spatial configuration. Because
interactions take place in space, individuals are more likely to be
close to those they have recently interacted with than to others.
Therefore, they are more likely to groom one another after an
interaction than at other times. Thus, we observe patterns of both
reconciliation of fights and reciprocation of grooming. In the
model, aggression determines the spatial structure of the group
[43]. At a high intensity of aggression a spatial structure develops
through the continuous fleeing of low ranking individuals.
Therefore, subordinates end up at the periphery and dominants
are located in the centre, and thus individuals are closer to others
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intensity of aggression [41]. Therefore at a high intensity of
aggression, since individuals are closer to others of similar rank,
they usually groom others of similar rank. Furthermore, at a high
intensity of aggression dominants interact more often than
subordinates, because dominants are surrounded at all sides by
others due to their spatial centrality. Consequently, because
dominants are more often aggressive than subordinates are, the
percentage of interaction time spent in grooming is lower at a high
than at a low intensity of aggression. Because individuals groom
relatively less often, this causes less reconciliation at a high than at
a low aggression intensity. Furthermore, due to the fact that the
spatial structure is relatively more rigid at a high aggression
intensity, individuals are more often close to the same partner and
this increases the chance that they are close to a former opponent
at all times. Therefore, the frequency with which individuals
groom with former opponents sooner after a fight than in the
matched control (MC-PC method) declines. This reduces the rate
of reported reconciliation. Besides, due to the relatively rigid
spatial structure at a high aggression intensity, individuals more
often reconcile with the same partners as they groom with and
thus, they reconcile with valuable partners more often than at a
low aggression intensity. In sum, aggression structures the spatial
configuration of individuals in the group and (together with
grooming out of fear of defeat) this structures the affiliative
patterns.
Relevance to empirical data
Although in empirical data rank is not measured by an internal
Dom value (like in our model), similar results were obtained in the
model if rank was computed by the empirical measure, the average
percentage of winning [95]. In the model, the correlations with
rank and 1) aggression given, 2) aggression received and 3) fights
lost appeared to be stronger at a high intensity of aggression than
at a low one (10–12 in Table 6). Whether this difference may serve
as a new indication of the degree of despotism for real primates,
needs further study (2–4 Table 2C).
The relevance of the model to affiliative patterns of primates is
supported by the following empirical evidence (Table 2). First, in
many species grooming up the hierarchy appears to be stronger
the steeper the gradient of the hierarchy when comparing between
groups of a single species [115] (conform 3 in Table 2A). Further,
the larger inter-individual distance at high versus low aggression
intensity in the model (6 in Table 2C) is confirmed in empirical
data at several levels of comparison, not only by a comparison
between species, namely between rhesus and tonkean macaques
[103], and between rhesus and stump-tailed macaques [106] (see
Table 1), but also within groups intense conflicts result in larger
distances between opponents than do mild conflicts in both a
group of Japanese macaques [116] and wild chimpanzees [117].
The correlation between proximity and grooming (1 in Table 2A)
is supported in lion-tailed macaques and tonkean macaques
[52,118] and by the difference in distance and grooming frequency
between despotic rhesus monkeys and egalitarian stump-tailed
macaques [106]. The combination of spatial configuration and
proximity induced grooming leads to reciprocity of grooming.
This mechanism may underlie the so-called ‘symmetry-based’
reciprocity [119] where the correlation results from a common
underlying variable, namely proximity.
As to the extent to which closer proximity between former
opponents after a fight explains the occurrence of the higher
grooming tendency after a fight (which is interpreted as
reconciliation), a number of empirical studies confirm this. These
studies concerned stump-tailed macaques, rhesus macaques
[19,120], Japanese macaques [116], Moor macaques [121] and
a comparison between studies of several species in captivity vs.
natural conditions [122].
However, a number of studies conclude that closer distance
after a fight cannot explain the conciliatory tendency exhaustively,
because when controlling for distance by matching (to some
degree) the distance in the matched control to that after the fight
(in the post conflict period), these studies show that a certain
conciliatory tendency still remains after controlling for distance
[21,63,123–126] despite a great reduction in the conciliatory
tendency in some studies [120]. Whether this also happens in the
model if we control for distance in the matched control of the MC-
PC method, we will study in future.
Further, as in the model (21 in Table 6; 1 in Table 2B), females
of a group of baboons reconciled more often with higher ranking
victims than lower ranking ones [127]. In the model, this arises at
a high aggression intensity, because individuals groom others of
higher rank more often, since they are afraid to attack them. Thus,
they also groom high ranking ones after a fight more often and
thus reconcile with others of higher rank more. Note that this
finding also may be interpreted in the frame of the most valuable
relationship hypothesis, because the higher the rank of the partner
(due to the effective support it can give, for instance) the more
valuable the individual is to reconcile with.
Further, as in the model, a correlation between rank and
grooming is lacking (2 in Table 2A) in the study of baboons and
vervets (which are despotic species) [128,129], but such a
correlation is found in lion tailed macaques (in this study this
species appears to be despotic) [52]. Since the absence of this
correlation in the model is due to spatial centrality of dominants,
we expect spatial social structure to be stronger in baboons and
vervets than in lion tailed macaques.
At a high intensity of attack, but not at a low one, lower ranking
females are more anxious (5 in Table 6; 12 in Table 2C), because
they more often receive aggression and lose fights than higher
ranking individuals in the model (10–12 in Table 6; 3–4 in
Table 2C). This is confirmed by correlations between the
frequency of receipt of aggression, the level of anxiety, and
anxiety-induced arthrosclerosis in the fiercely aggressive despotic
macaque species, rhesus and long-tailed macaques [130–132]. It is
of interest to see whether in empirical data, like in the model (5 in
Table 6) this correlation between rank and anxiety is weaker in
egalitarian species (12 in Table 2C).
Thinking along the lines of dominance relations, our model
may also change our explanations for two other phenomena.
Firstly, in female-bonded species, in primate groups that are
more female-biased females appear to groom less frequently.
This is explained by the assumption that in female-bonded
groups not every female needs to groom every other [133].
According to our model, however, reduced grooming by
females in a group that is female-biased may be a side-effect of
the rule that individuals groom the others out of fear of defeat:
Because in a female-biased group females meet other females
more often and they fear defeat less if they meet a female than
if they meet a male, they will attack more than in a group with
more males. Second, the fact that female macaques groom
males more often than vice versa [118,134–137] is explained
by our model as a consequence of their subordinance to males.
From this we may derive another prediction: since in despotic
species females are dominant over a higher number of males
than in egalitarian species [45], we expect that (for the same
adult sex ratio in despotic and egalitarian groups) females of
despotic species groom males less than females of egalitarian
species do (13 in Table 2C).
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Our model shows the four different levels of complexity of social
behaviour distinguished by Hinde [138]: Individual behaviour,
interactions, relationships and social structure. In agreement with
Hinde’suggestion, each level can be described in terms of the level
below it, and levels influence each other mutually. For instance,
the nature of the behaviour of the participants influences their
relationship and these relationships in turn, also influence the
behaviour of the participants. Also related to this view is that
observed social structure can vary dramatically with circumstanc-
es, without any changes in the underlying motivational mecha-
nisms or strategies. For instance, here we show that patterns of
reconciliation differ depending on intensity of aggression and in
our former paper we showed that female dominance increases
with the percentage of males in the group [45].
A criticism made against DomWorld by Bryson and co-authors
[139] has been that the dominance hierarchy in the model was not
as stable as that of real primates. The dominance hierarchy in
GrooFiWorld is stable, however, because average dominance
values between periods 200 and 230 are significantly correlated
with those between 231 and 260 (see methods). Further, in
GrooFiWorld we have shown that even if we keep the hierarchy
100% stable (by omitting the self-reinforcing effects of winning and
losing fights) all patterns remain similar (Table 4, 5).
Another criticism concerned the directional inconsistency of
aggression [140].Thedirectional inconsistency ofaggression at high
aggression intensity inDomWorld appeared to be lowerthan that in
empirical data. In the present paper, in GrooFiWorld, the
directional inconsistency is higher than in DomWorld. 0.73 vs
0.55 respectively, because in GrooFiWorld the individuals think
twice before they attack, whereas in DomWorld they think only
once and thus, attack higher ranking individuals more often. How it
compares exactly to empirical data is not clear, because the matrices
tested by de Vries sometimes comprise of males, sometimes of
females and sometimes of both sexes and the directional
inconsistency probably depends on the group composition.
However, despotic macaque species show an average directional
inconsistency of 0.89, which still is above that of GrooFiWorld. To
study this in more detail is beyond the scope of this paper.
Yet, there are other shortcomings in our study of the model that
will be amended in future. There are a number of patterns related
to reconciliation that have been found in studies of real primates
that we do not yet treat in the model [25,110,127,141–143], we
used the time rule method [58] neither to test for reconciliation
nor for the valuable relationship hypothesis, nor did we control for
proximity in our study of reconciliation [63]. The rule of grooming
out of fear of defeat may be interpreted by assuming that
individuals groom others to calm these partners down and to
forestall the chance of receiving aggression from them; thus, it
could be viewed as an exchange of grooming for tolerance.
However, in the present model grooming others does not influence
whether or not the groomee will subsequently attack the groomer.
The model also does not represent cases in which grooming can be
rejected by the receiver, nor pre-existing differences between
individuals, such as are apparent, for instance, between primates of
different personality [144], nor what individuals compete for such
as sex or food. It omits kin-relations and offspring among partners
as well as coalitions. Besides, we have not yet studied effects of
different sex ratios, whereas primate groups of the same species
may differ in sex ratios, and this has been shown to have an
influence on their affiliative patterns [133,145–147]. These are
natural variations and extensions that will need to be added to our
model, as we intend to do in future studies.
As to cognition, our model does not at all reflect the behavioural
and cognitive complexity of primates. Regarding affiliation, it is
confined only to the representation of an anxiety reducing effect of
grooming in the context of a competitive regime. Because of the
resemblance of the emergent affiliative patterns in our model to those
of primates, similar processes may cause these affiliative patterns in
primatesalso.Whether or not primatesmay (sometimes)usethemore
complex cognitive rules that have been suggested by primatologists
before, our model cannot decide. Instead, our model may be used as
a null-model that indicates what patterns we should expect in the
absence of the usual cognitive rules regarding reciprocation,
reconciliation etcetera. Thus, it does not deny that primates are
intelligent as has been shown in many experimental studies
[37,38,148], but it questions whether these primates use all aspects
of their intelligence in all contexts. It illustrates that apart from the
here reproduced patterns at a group level in the model, extra
evidence, is needed as proof of 1) intentional reciprocation, 2)
competition for higher ranking grooming partners, and 3) intentional
exchange and 4) intentional reconciliation. Further, our model points
to the need for more studies of the spatial distribution of monkeys
within a group. Of these studies [108,149] (Girod, Thierry,
Hemelrijk, in prep), there have been only a few so far.
In sum, we have shown that without the specific cognitive
assumptions for the creation of each pattern of grooming,
cognitively simple local interactions and self-organization suffice
to produce many of the affiliative patterns that are typical of
egalitarian and despotic primate societies (Table 1, 4) and also a
number of other patterns (Table 6). The main finding is that the
spatial configuration associated with the competitive regime and
grooming out of fear of defeat or out of anxiety structure the
patterns of grooming such that we measure patterns of reciproca-
tion, exchange and reconciliation. This leads to a number of model-
based hypotheses for real primates (Table 2). Because the model
generates many of the behavioural patterns found in real primates,
but does so without the usually assumed cognitive processes, it can
be used as a null model for studying primate affiliative behaviour.
Supporting Information
Video S1 DemoGrooFiWorld. Individuals are represented by
circles, their headings are given by a red arrow and their activity is
indicated by their colour. If it moves, turns or rests, it is light blue;
if it fights, it becomes dark blue; and if it grooms, it turns green.
Note that after grooming individuals turn away from each other.
Several cases of reconciliation can be observed, for instance: From
second 7 to 10: two individuals on the upper left side of the screen
fight at around second 7 and they reconcile at around second 10.
From second 36 to 39: two individuals on the left side of the screen
fight at around second 36 and they reconcile at second 39. From
second 31 till 49: Two individuals on the upper right side of the
screen fight 3 times from second 31 to 38 and they reconcile
subsequently around second 49.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000630.s001 (1.34 MB
AVI)
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